**Presentation Title**

*Integrating the Military Instrument to Enhance Social Resilience*

**Research Question (RQ)**

How can the military instrument, when integrated with other instruments of national power, enhance societal resilience to non-traditional security threats while balancing strategic effectiveness, ethical leadership, and civil-military legitimacy?

**Sub-questions (merged for 3 speakers)**

1. How does mission command, supported by AI and uncrewed systems, enable military contributions to resilience under crisis conditions, and what ethical risks arise from decentralised decision-making?
2. In what ways must military organisations adapt structurally and culturally to assume resilience roles while balancing interagency cooperation, ethics, and core defence functions?
3. How do hybrid and technological threats alter the character of warfare and shape the military’s role in sustaining societal resilience, trust, and democratic legitimacy, particularly for small states like Ireland?

**Analytical Framework (Effects)**

* Command Decentralisation Effect
* Organisational Adaptation Effect
* Resilience Synergy Effect
* Community Integration Effect
* Asymmetry Effect

**Speaker Division (10 mins each)**

**Speaker 1 – Mission Command & Autonomy**

* **Sub-question 1**
* **Effect:** *Command Decentralisation Effect*
* **Focus:** Ukraine drones, OODA loop acceleration, risks of AI centralisation.
* **DSS Value:** Links mission command doctrine to resilience.

**Speaker 2 – You (Organisation & Adaptation → Thesis Crossover)**

* **Sub-question 2**
* **Effects:** *Organisational Adaptation Effect* + *Resilience Synergy Effect*
* **Focus:**
  + Organisational culture change, doctrinal inertia, interagency frictions.
  + Ireland’s EU Battlegroup 2024–25 prep + UNIFIL as case studies.
  + Ethics overlay: balancing resilience with core defence functions.
* **DSS Value:** Evaluates organisational change and integration into resilience strategies.

**Speaker 3 – Warfare Character & Civil-Military Legitimacy**

* **Sub-question 3 (merged)**
* **Effects:** *Community Integration Effect* + *Asymmetry Effect*
* **Focus:**
  + Hybrid threats and societal trust.
  + Small-state resilience strategies (Estonia cyber, Ireland UNIFIL).
  + Civil-military legitimacy and risks of over-securitisation.
* **DSS Value:** Connects character of warfare to resilience, legitimacy, and small-state strategies.

Briefing Note — Speaker 2 (DSS Presentation)

Topic: Organisational & Cultural Adaptation of Militaries for Resilience Roles

Sub-question: In what ways must military organisations adapt structurally and culturally to assume resilience roles while balancing interagency cooperation, ethics, and core defence functions?

1. Core Responsibilities

Anchor themes:

Organisational culture change & doctrinal inertia.

Interagency frictions (EU Battlegroup 2024–25, UNIFIL case studies).

Ethics overlay: balancing resilience roles with core defence functions.

Link to Analytical Framework:

Organisational Adaptation Effect → structures & doctrine.

Resilience Synergy Effect → interagency integration.

2. Authors to Lean On

Organisational Culture & Inertia

Krepinevich (1992) – reform required with tech; invention alone insufficient.

Betts (1996) – “conservative progressivism”; misuse of tech due to inertia.

Metz (2000) – innovation often triggered by defeat/shock.

Gray (2005) – strategic culture dominates over technology.

Cohen (2002) – leaders override/reinforce organisational culture.

Interagency Frictions (Battlegroup & UNIFIL)

Huntington (1957) – autonomy vs control; structural role conflict.

Janowitz (1960) – constabulary concept; blending military/civil roles.

Schiff (1995) – concordance theory; alignment needed across actors.

Feaver (2003) – agency theory; mistrust drives oversight.

Brooks (2008) – civil–military politics shape strategy.

Kaldor (1999) – “new wars,” human security, resilience framing.

Ethics Overlay (Balancing Roles)

Burk (2002) – democratic legitimacy as essential anchor.

Cook (2004) – ethics of service; leadership obligations.

Forster (2006) – legitimacy and adaptation in European militaries.

Moskos (2000) – “postmodern military,” blurred boundaries of role.

Freedman (2006) – strategy in new domains; legitimacy risk.

3. How to Deploy the Sources

A. Organisational Culture & Doctrinal Inertia

Use Krepinevich and Metz to show need for adaptation (structure must evolve).

Contrast with Betts and Gray → inertia is normal; culture trumps gadgets.

Add Cohen for leadership influence: how senior leaders can block/enable change.

Application: Frame Irish Defence Forces’ doctrinal inertia (e.g., slow adaptation post-CODF) as consistent with these theories.

B. Interagency Frictions — EU Battlegroup 2024–25 & UNIFIL

Use Huntington and Feaver → structural mistrust between military and civilian agencies.

Apply Schiff → concordance needed in Irish interagency planning (Battlegroup prep).

Use Janowitz and Kaldor → cultural blending of civil–military functions under resilience.

Case: UNIFIL shows frictions between humanitarian/military roles.

Case: EU Battlegroup highlights interagency duplication, structural gaps.

C. Ethics Overlay

Burk and Cook → ethics underpin legitimacy in democracies.

Moskos → “postmodern military” concept explains mission creep risks.

Forster → European models of balancing legitimacy with adaptation.

Freedman → warns of over-securitisation; strategic legitimacy can erode trust.

Application: Irish DF resilience tasks must not dilute warfighting or legitimacy (neutrality, trust, civil primacy).

4. Key Messages for Delivery

Claim: Militaries cannot assume resilience roles without cultural and structural change.

Evidence: Krepinevich, Metz.

However: Betts and Gray warn inertia is endemic.

Implication: Irish DF must resource reforms to avoid tokenism.

Claim: Interagency frictions risk undermining resilience synergy.

Evidence: UNIFIL and EU Battlegroup cases.

However: Schiff shows concordance can overcome friction.

Implication: Ireland must embed coordination structures beyond rhetoric.

Claim: Ethics and legitimacy are the anchor of resilience roles.

Evidence: Burk, Cook, Moskos.

However: Freedman warns of securitisation backlash.

Implication: Ireland must guard neutrality and civil primacy while adapting.

5. Practical Prep Steps

Structure notes around 3 pillars (Culture/Inertia → Interagency → Ethics).

Drop in one core author per point (examiner recognition).

Use Irish cases (EU BG, UNIFIL, CODF reforms) to ground theory.

End each mini-section with Limit → Implication in plain form.

Keep sentences short; avoid jargon.

6. If Time is Tight

Prioritise Krepinevich, Betts, Huntington, Schiff, Kaldor, Burk → these cover all three themes at minimum.

Use one Irish case (EU Battlegroup) and one overseas (UNIFIL) to show applied understanding.

**1. Organisational Culture Change & Doctrinal Inertia**

*Focus: cultural barriers, inertia, adaptation under pressure*

* **Andrew F. Krepinevich – *The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment* (1992)**  
  → Core thesis: invention without organisational reform is a dead end. Perfect for doctrinal inertia arguments.
* **Richard K. Betts – *The Downside of the Cutting Edge* (1996)**  
  → Warns against misuse of technology due to cultural conservatism. Shows inertia cloaked as progress.
* **Stephen Metz – *The Next Twist of the RMA* (2000)**  
  → Innovation follows shock/defeat; smaller forces adapt culturally faster. Fits resilience/organisational agility angle.
* **Colin S. Gray – *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (2005)**  
  → Strategic culture matters more than technology; cultural continuity dominates. Anchors “doctrinal inertia” theme.
* **Eliot A. Cohen – *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (2002)**  
  → Shows how leaders override or reinforce culture/doctrine. Bridges organisational culture with strategic leadership.

**2. Interagency Frictions — EU Battlegroup 2024–25 & UNIFIL**

*Focus: cooperation barriers, multinational dynamics, interagency complexity*

* **Samuel Huntington – *The Soldier and the State* (1957)**  
  → Classic tension between military autonomy and civilian authority. Frames interagency friction risks.
* **Morris Janowitz – *The Professional Soldier* (1960)**  
  → Constabulary ethos; militaries blend into societal functions. Direct link to resilience and interagency overlap.
* **Rebecca L. Schiff – *The Military and Domestic Politics* (1995)**  
  → Concordance theory: effective civil–military outcomes need alignment across military, political elites, and society. Perfect for “community integration” in UNIFIL.
* **Peter D. Feaver – *Armed Servants* (2003)**  
  → Agency theory; oversight vs autonomy. Explains interagency mistrust in multinational/EU Battlegroup contexts.
* **Risa Brooks – *Shaping Strategy* (2008)**  
  → Civil–military politics affect strategic assessment. Links to Battlegroup planning friction.
* **Mary Kaldor – *New and Old Wars* (1999)**  
  → Frames resilience as “human security”; integrates military and civilian actors in new threat environments. Fits resilience synergy effect.

**3. Ethics Overlay — Balancing Resilience with Core Defence Functions**

*Focus: ethical legitimacy, role creep, civil–military trust*

* **James Burk – *Theories of Democratic Civil–Military Relations* (2002)**  
  → Legitimacy depends on democratic oversight; ethical anchor for resilience vs core defence balance.
* **Martin L. Cook – *The Moral Warrior* (2004)**  
  → Military ethics in operations; bridges resilience and core defence through ethical leadership.
* **Anthony Forster – *Armed Forces and Society in Europe* (2006)**  
  → Explores European militaries adapting legitimacy frameworks. Excellent for Irish/EU overlap.
* **Charles Moskos – *The Postmodern Military* (2000)**  
  → “Postmodern military” blurs boundaries between combat, peacekeeping, and resilience. Central to culture/ethics balance.
* **Lawrence Freedman – *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs* (2006)**  
  → Strategy in new domains; legitimising military action under non-traditional threats. Useful for over-securitisation risks.

**Organisational Culture Change & Doctrinal Inertia**

**Prioritise papers (shorter, sharper, directly examinable):**

* **Andrew F. Krepinevich – *The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment* (1992)**  
  → Seminal CSBA paper, widely cited in RMA debates. Anchor point for “adaptation vs inertia.”
* **Richard K. Betts – *The Downside of the Cutting Edge* (The National Interest, 1996)**  
  → Policy journal article; great for showing caution against over-optimism.
* **Stephen Metz – *The Next Twist of the RMA* (Parameters, 2000)**  
  → US Army War College journal; concise treatment of adaptation after shocks.

**Books are useful but secondary here:**

* Colin S. Gray – *Another Bloody Century* (2005) → Use selectively for strategic culture.
* Eliot A. Cohen – *Supreme Command* (2002) → Long, more leadership history; quote only to bridge civil–military culture.

**2. Interagency Frictions — EU Battlegroup 2024–25 & UNIFIL**

**Prioritise papers/articles:**

* **Rebecca L. Schiff – *Concordance Theory of Civil–Military Relations* (Armed Forces & Society, 1995)**  
  → Journal article version; shorter and directly relevant to interagency integration.
* **Peter D. Feaver – *Agency Theory and Civil–Military Relations* (Armed Forces & Society, 1999)**  
  → Article predating his book *Armed Servants* (2003). Lighter lift, still authoritative.
* **Risa Brooks – *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (International Security, 2008)**  
  → Top-tier journal; strong on interagency strategy failures.
* **Mary Kaldor – *In Defence of New Wars* (Stability, 2013)** or *Human Security* (various articles).  
  → Prioritise her journal work over the book. Key for resilience/human security framing.

**Books to down-prioritise (unless you need a definitional anchor):**

* Huntington (*The Soldier and the State*, 1957) – still examiners expect one line from it, but keep very light.
* Janowitz (*The Professional Soldier*, 1960) – same as above; legacy citation, don’t overuse.

**3. Ethics Overlay — Balancing Resilience with Core Defence Functions**

**Prioritise articles/chapters:**

* **James Burk – *Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Armed Forces & Society, 2002)**  
  → Concise article, ideal for legitimacy theme.
* **Martin L. Cook – journal pieces** (e.g. *Moral Foundations of Military Service*, Journal of Military Ethics, 2004)  
  → Use articles if possible, quote *The Moral Warrior* sparingly.
* **Anthony Forster – journal output** (e.g. *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Continuity and Change*, European Security, 2006)  
  → Journal work aligns better with “legitimacy & EU” angle than his book.
* **Charles Moskos – “The Postmodern Military” (chapter in *Armed Forces & Society*, 2000)**  
  → Often cited via article/chapter form; good for role-blurring arguments.
* **Lawrence Freedman – *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs* (Adelphi Paper, IISS, 2006)**  
  → Technically a long paper (Adelphi series), not a full book → counts as a prioritised paper.

**Takeaway — Prioritisation Rule for Your Essay**

* **Core papers/journal pieces to emphasise (10/10 priority):**  
  Krepinevich (1992), Betts (1996), Metz (2000), Schiff (1995), Feaver (1999), Brooks (2008), Kaldor (2013), Burk (2002), Cook (2004 article), Freedman (2006).
* **Books to touch lightly (3/10 priority — definitional, legacy, or synthesis only):**  
  Gray (2005), Cohen (2002), Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), Forster (2006 book), Moskos (2000 edited volume).

Here is my section. I cover organisation and adaptation, then bridge to interagency synergy and ethics so Romin can land legitimacy. Our research question is how the military instrument, integrated with other instruments of national power, can enhance societal resilience to non-traditional threats while balancing strategic effectiveness, ethical leadership and civil-military legitimacy. My answer in one line: militaries enhance resilience only when they change culture and structures to partner beyond defence, while protecting mission command and democratic legitimacy.

I sit between Sinéad’s problem framing and Romin’s legitimacy close. The agreed split is: Speaker 1 does mission command and autonomy, I do organisational adaptation and resilience synergy, then Speaker 3 does warfare’s character and civil-military legitimacy. I will keep the baton tight to our framework so the argument reads as one paper.

Before I dive in, two housekeeping rules I will enforce throughout. First, critical synthesis over description. Second, every section ends with Limit then Implication for the Defence Forces. Examiners scan for that discipline, and it keeps us honest.

**1) Organisational culture change and doctrinal inertia**  
If resilience is the end, integration is the way, and the military instrument is the means, then culture is the brake and the accelerator. The literature converges on a simple proposition: invention without reorganisation is a dead end. Krepinevich’s early military-technical work is explicit that new tools fail without new structures and concepts. Metz adds that shocks trigger change. Betts and Gray caution that culture sticks and misuses technology under the banner of progress. The upshot for us is that adaptation is primarily social and organisational, not technical.

Cohen gives the operational risk in one image: leaders can now “perch cybernetically” beside subordinates and intervene at will. That is the digital temptation to centralise under stress. If we expand into resilience roles while digitising command, we will corrode mission command unless we deliberately redesign decision rights and battle rhythms to protect delegation.

Practical move for the Defence Forces: treat resilience tasks as a design problem, not an add-on. Build standing cross-functional cells that pair line units with cyber, engineers, medics and comms, and write mission-type orders for civil support just as we do for operations abroad. Our own thesis work frames this succinctly: technology can reinforce Auftragstaktik when organisational restraint is built in. That principle should govern resilience as much as combat.

Limit: our best sources skew US-centric and RMA-framed, and Irish thresholds are not quantified.  
Implication: prioritise organisational reforms that protect delegation and speed decision cycles before buying more dashboards.

**2) Interagency frictions and the Resilience Synergy Effect**  
Resilience is produced in the seams between instruments of power, not in one department. That is why our framework places the Resilience Synergy Effect alongside organisational adaptation for this slot. The test cases we use are close to home: EU Battlegroup preparation and UNIFIL practice. Both expose the same tension: military autonomy versus civilian primacy in complex coalitions and national systems. Huntington names the structural pull to autonomy, Janowitz anticipates constabulary blending, and Feaver’s agency lens explains why mistrust drives intrusive oversight.

Schiff cuts through the polarity by giving us a civ-mil integration scorecard. Concordance means alignment across four indicators: the social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making, recruitment method and military style. When the political leadership, the military and the citizenry are aligned on those, the risk of domestic intervention falls and cooperation rises. Read that again as a resilience recipe: if those four align for civil-mil tasks, interagency friction turns into synergy.

So what does good look like for Ireland. For the EU Battlegroup, embed concordance upstream by hard-wiring DF–DoD–DFA planning boards, common risk registers and joint information practices so that political decision cycles and military styles do not clash under tempo. For UNIFIL, translate concordance into daily practice by rehearsing humanitarian-military interfaces with NGOs and host authorities before rotation, and by assigning liaison officers with clear standing authorities. These moves make the Resilience Synergy Effect real, not rhetorical. Our proposal explicitly flags Battlegroup duplication and UNIFIL frictions as the proving grounds.

Limit: we have not presented Irish interagency performance metrics, and UNIFIL friction varies by sector and mandate.  
Implication: create a national resilience scorecard built on Schiff’s four indicators to monitor concordance quarterly across DF, DoD, DFA and key civil agencies.

**3) Ethics overlay: legitimacy as the anchor of resilience**  
Expanding military roles inside society is not a free lunch. Moskos warned of a postmodern drift from institution to occupation, where market logics and role blurring corrode vocation and widen the civil-military gap. Burk and Cook remind us that democratic legitimacy rests on oversight and ethical leadership, not just competence. Freedman warns that over-securitisation can backfire strategically. For a small state with neutrality norms, legitimacy is an operational constraint and an asset. Keep it, or resilience turns brittle.

Design choices follow. First, do not hollow out warfighting to do resilience. Cohen notes the long-term shift toward managerial specialists and new elites. That will continue, but we must preserve a warrior ethos while bringing in linguists, cyber, medics and engineers. That balance supports consent abroad and trust at home. Second, codify ethical red lines for domestic support tasks: clear authorities, consent-based information support, proportionate use of force and transparent after-action review with civilian partners. Third, make communication part of command: explain what the military is doing for communities in plain language. Legitimacy is not spin. It is consistent behaviour under law.

Limit: our ethics sources are listed for use rather than fully excerpted here, and Irish doctrine on domestic operations is still evolving.  
Implication: pair any new resilience tasking with an ethics annex and a public-facing narrative agreed with government, and audit both annually.

**Tying the effects together**  
Across these three moves, the thread is simple. To integrate the military instrument for societal resilience we need two effects working in tandem. The Organisational Adaptation Effect supplies structures, doctrine and decision rights that protect mission command while expanding roles. The Resilience Synergy Effect supplies concordance across state actors and society so that integration is legitimate and effective. Our group plan and my slot were designed around those effects; I have kept to them so our argument reads as one.

**What the Defence Forces should actually do next**  
Three concrete steps to land the argument. One, stand up a Joint Resilience Integration Board with DoD and DFA that owns a national concordance dashboard keyed to recruitment, decision-making and style, with DF reporting quarterly. Two, publish a Mission Command in the Digital Age directive that sets red-line rules for remote oversight, establishes distributed battle rhythms for domestic support, and trains commanders to refuse unhelpful meddling. Three, re-weight career structures to value resilience skills without diluting warfighting: create fast streams for cyber, engineers and liaison officers, paired with command tours in manoeuvre units. These draw directly from our reading that organisation beats gadgetry and that legitimacy is won by design, not afterthought.

I close where I opened. We assess the utility and limits of the military instrument for societal resilience in concert with other instruments. My position is that utility rises sharply when culture and structure change first and when concordance and ethics are treated as hard requirements. Otherwise, we spend more for less and risk trust. Limit: time restricts me to architecture rather than full case metrics. Implication: the panel should judge us on whether we have shown a pathway to make resilience real, legitimate and Irish.

**Hand-off**  
Romin now takes the baton to test these claims against cyber and disinformation cases and to weigh the legitimacy risks we have flagged. My last word is a BLUF for the whole team: integration works when we change ourselves and align with others. That is how a small state makes resilience durable.

**Limit. Implication:** We have synthesised cross-atlantic theory for an Irish audience and leaned on internal planning documents. Implication: convert these into standing boards, directives and scorecards before the next rotation or Battlegroup gate.

Include the “grand bargains” per BROOKS\_2024

***The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*** is a 1957 book written by [political scientist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_scientist) [Samuel P. Huntington](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_P._Huntington).

The professional soldier, a social and political portrait

by

[Janowitz, Morris](https://archive.org/search.php?query=creator%3A%22Janowitz%2C+Morris%22)

Publication date

[1960](https://archive.org/search.php?query=date:1960)

Feaver also must be cited

The framework I want this written on is

Coherent institutions that can act quickly together;

Trust networks that share information and resources under stress;

Efficient use of expertise and logistics in emergencies.

These may sound like bureaucratic episodes, but they go to the heart of resilience. When trust is absent, institutions hoard control instead of sharing capability. Resilience depends on pre-existing cooperation, not improvisation during crisis. If the Defence Forces are excluded from planning, or if professional expertise is discounted in procurement, the state loses speed, precision and redundancy—the very qualities that make systems recover. In this sense, organisational mistrust is not a political nuisance; it is a resilience vulnerability.